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I.     Introduction
On a global scale wage differences are enormous across countries ranging from,
for example, 1,10 € per hour in China to almost 28 € per hour in Germany (see, e.g.
Sinn (2006)). Wage differences like this constitute a central explanation for the
increasingly dominant business practice of international outsourcing across a wide
range of industries. For example, Business Week (2003), Amiti and Wei (2004) as
well as Rishi and Saxena (2003) refer to the huge difference in labour costs as the key
explanation for the strong increase in outsourcing of both manufacturing and services
to countries with low labour costs. However, the exploitation of the marginal cost
advantages offered by production in low-wage countries typically requires that the
firms make sunk investments into the establishment of networks of suppliers in the
relevant low-wage countries.
In countries with strong labour market imperfections the labour unions, and
sometimes citizens more generally, typically express deep concerns when facing the
challenge of large-scale outsourcing. These concerns often seem to focus on the
consequences of large-scale outsourcing for employment in high-wage countries. This
is the topic of this article. More precisely, we design a model to answer the following
questions: What is the effect of a commitment to outsourcing on wage formation in an
imperfectly competitive labour market where labour unions and firms negotiate over
wages? What are the associated effects on equilibrium unemployment in a country
with such labour market imperfections? We also explore the relationship between
outsourcing and wage formation in the other direction, by asking: How will the
presence of labour market imperfections in the high-wage country impact on the
outsourcing incentives of firms? Will stronger labour market imperfections increase
the optimal scale of outsourcing?
We find that the wage elasticity of labour demand is increasing as a function of
the share of outsourcing, a result consistent with existing empirical research, as we
will see below. Furthermore, within the framework of our model we show that a
production mode with a higher proportion of outsourcing reduces the negotiated wage
1in the high-wage country with an imperfectly competitive labour market. For this
reason outsourcing reduces equilibrium unemployment. Finally, we characterize the
optimal production mode and show that stronger labour market imperfections lead to
a production mode with a higher share of outsourcing.
Despite the apparent significance of the issue it is somewhat surprising to
observe that the existing research has explored the implications international
outsourcing for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of labour market
imperfections only to a fairly limited extent. Below we briefly describe the relevant
literature focusing on this issue so as to highlight how this study adds to our
knowledge.
Danthine and Hunt (1994) have both theoretically and empirically studied the
effects of international outsourcing and foreign direct investment on wage formation
in the home country. They showed that higher product market integration implies
intensified product market competition, which moderates wage increases in unionised
labour markets. Zhao (1998) has studied the impact of foreign direct investment on
wages and employment, when labour-management bargaining is industry-wide. He
argued that foreign direct investment reduces the negotiated wage if the union focuses
on wages. Glass and Saggi (2001) have studied the causes of outsourcing and its
effects, finding that higher international outsourcing lowers both the relative wage of
workers and increases the returns from innovation.
Skaksen and Sorensen (2001) have studied the effects on trade unions of firms’
foreign direct investments, which are made prior to the stage of the wage bargaining.
They argued that if there is a high degree of substitutability (complementarity)
between the activities in the home country and in the host country, then it is likely
that foreign direct investments reduce (increase) negotiated wages. Skaksen (2004)
has analyzed the implications of outsourcing, in terms of both potential (non-realized)
and realized international outsourcing, for wage setting and employment with
imperfectly competitive labour markets. He assumed that the firms do not commit
themselves to outsourcing prior wage negotiation, but that the outsourcing decisions
are made after the wage negotiations.
Lommerud, Meland and Straume (2005) have analyzed the incentives of firms
operating in unionized industries to outsource the production of intermediate goods to
foreign low-cost subcontractors. They argue that firms will have returns from
outsourcing if they face stronger unions, contributing to higher domestic wages.
2Furthermore, they show that intensified product market competition will increase the
incentives for international outsourcing. However, since their analysis is restricted to
a partial equilibrium model they do not analyze the relationship between equilibrium
unemployment and international outsourcing,
In terms of empirics Feenstra and Hanson (1999) have studied the impact of
foreign outsourcing and technology on wages using U.S. data over the period 1979-
1990. According to their findings, wages of low-skilled workers have fallen relative
to those of high-skilled workers. Recently, Senses (2006) has argued that an increased
probability of outsourcing associated with a decline in foreign intermediate input
prices and an increase in the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic
inputs might increase the wage elasticity of labour demand. He has provided relevant
empirical evidence, according to which a production mode with more outsourcing
increases the wage elasticity of labour demand.
Our study proceeds as follows. Section II presents the basic structure of the
model as well as the time sequence of the decisions in terms of outsourcing, wage
bargaining and labour demand. Labour demand by firms is studied in section III,
wheras we focus on wage determination through Nash bargaining in Section IV.
Section V explores how the production mode affects equilibrium unemployment. In
section VI we investigate the optimal outsourcing decision in the presence of labour
market imperfections. Finally, we present concluding comments in Section VII.
II.    Basic Framework
We focus on a model with imperfections in the domestic labour market. In the
long run, at stage 1, firms establish a network for foreign outsourcing. Outsourced
production in a foreign low-wage country has the advantage of avoiding the wage
mark-ups imposed by the unions in the firm’s domestic high-wage country. More
precisely, with outsourced production the firm can acquire labour input at the factor
price c, which is lower than the negotiated wage w in the high-wage country.
However, there is a fixed (sunk) cost of establishing capacity for foreign outsourced
production. In  order to exploit M units of outsourced labour input the firm has to
3make the irreversible investment )(Mg  with the properties that 0)( ?? Mg  and
0)( ??? Mg .
The outsourcing decisions serve as commitments relative to wage negotiation
 and employment decisions in the home country. Thus, the outsourcing decisions are
made in anticipation of their effects on wage setting and labour demand. A stage 2
there is wage negotiation between firms and labour unions and this bargaining is
conducted conditional on the outsourcing commitments. The wage negotiations in
their turn take place in anticipation of the consequences for  labour demand. At stage
3 firms make employment decisions by taking the negotiated wage rate and the
production mode as given.
We summarize the time sequence of decisions in Figure 1. In the subsequent sections
we derive the decisions taking place at different stages by using backward induction.
           Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
        time
outsourcing wage labour demand L
decision M bargaining Nw
 Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions
This timing structure captures the idea of long-term production mode decisions,
which are inflexible at the stage when the wage negotiations are undertaken. Such a
timing structure seems plausible when the implementation of a production mode with
outsourcing requires irreversible long-term investments for the establishment of a
network of component suppliers. Of course, in principle, the relative timing between
the negotiated wage setting and the production mode decisions could also be reversed
so as to capture that the negotiated wage serves as a long-term commitment relative to
the production mode decision. This has been done by Skaksen (2004) using a Cobb-
Douglas production function with domestic and foreign labour.
4We postulate a CES production function according to
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where M  denotes the firm’s labour input acquired from external suppliers through
outsourcing, L  is the amount of labour employed in-house, and a , ? and ?  are
parameters satisfying 0 < a < 1, and 10 ?? ? , respectively. In (1) a is the
distribution parameter (see e.g. Arrow et al (1961)) between the production factors,
while ? captures the elasticity of substitution between the two different types of
labour inputs. In what follows we assume that 10 ??? . This can be justified as
follows: Under this assumption a production mode with more outsourcing increases
the wage elasticity of labour demand, as we will show in the next section. Senses
(2006) has provided relevant empirical evidence, which lies in conformity with this
implication. Through the parameter ?  the production function (1) exhibits
diminishing returns to scale. Overall, this production function introduces, as we will
see, interesting relationships between the production mode and equilibrium
unemployment both in the short and in the long run, i.e. no matter whether the
production mode is exogenous or endogenous.
III.  Labour Demand
The firm decides on domestic in-house employment so as to maximize the profit
function
? LwLMR
L
?? ),(max
)(
?                   (2)
by taking both the negotiated wage rate w  and the established capacity for
outsourced labour inputs M  as given. The necessary first-order condition associated
with (2) is
0??? wRLL?       (3)
5and the associated second-order condition 0?? LLLL R?  holds true. The formulation
(3) is an implicit characterization of labour demand capturing the familiar idea that
the firm expands in-house employment until marginal return of labour coincides with
the wage. For the CES production function (1) the first-order condition (3) can be
expressed as waLaLMa ??
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labour demand in terms of outsourced labour inputs, wage rate, elasticity of
substitution and parameters a  and ?  as follows
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The wage elasticity of labour demand, which turns out to be important later on, can
be calculated to be (see Appendix A)
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where LMm /?  denotes the ratio between the labour inputs acquired through
outsourcing and domestic in-house employment. For short and admittedly somewhat
incompletely, we will subsequently refer to m as the share of outsourced production.
From (4) we can conclude that the wage elasticity of labour demand, 1)( ?
L
M? ,
depends on two structural features in addition to the parameters a  and ?  of the
production function: (i) the elasticity of substitution between the labour inputs
acquired through outsourcing and domestic in-house employment (? ) and (ii) the
production mode, or, more precisely, the share of outsourced production ( LMm /? ).
We now ask: What is the effect of the production mode on the wage elasticity of
labour demand? This is an important question to answer as the wage elasticity in the
6case of CES production function affects the negotiated wage. Differentiating (4) with
respect to M  yields
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Under decreasing returns to scale ( 1?? ) we can formulate the following property
from (5).
Proposition 1 The wage elasticity of labour demand depends on the elasticity of
substitution between labour inputs acquired through outsourcing and in-house
employment. The wage elasticity of labour is an increasing function of the share
of outsourced production when 1?? .
 According to (5) the technological elasticity of substitution between the
production factors L  and M is of primary importance for the relationship between
the share of outsourced production ( LMm /? ) and the wage elasticity of labour
demand. When M and L  are ‘gross complements’ ( 1?? ), a higher LMm /?  will
increase the wage elasticity of labour demand due to the fact that it will raise the
home country labour share.
IV. Wage Determination via Nash Bargaining
   We now proceed to investigate wage determination and continue to consider
the acquired outsourced production M  as given. We apply the Nash bargaining
solution following the ‘right-to-manage’ approach so that the wage negotiations take
place in anticipation of optimal price and employment decisions by the firms (see e.g.
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), Chapter 7). The union’s objective function is assumed
to be )(ˆ ** LNbwLU ??? , where b  is the (exogenous) outside option available to
union members and N is the number of union members ( )*LN ? . The threat points
7for the union and for the representative firm are )(MgMco ????  and bNU o ? ,
respectively. Hence we have that )(ˆ * bwLNbUU ????  and
.),()(ˆ ** wLLMRMgMc ????? ??
Following the Nash bargaining approach the firm and the labour union negotiate
with respect to the wage so as to solve the optimization problem
? ? ? ? ? ?? ????? 1***
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where the relative bargaining power of the union is ?  and that of the firm is )1( ?? .
The necessary first-order condition for the negotiated wage can be written as
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Substituting the expressions (8a) and (8b) into the first-order condition (7) yields,
after some rearrangement, the following Nash bargaining solution for the wage rate
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8According to (9) the negotiated wage rate depends positively on the outside
option ( b ) and on the relative bargaining power of the labour union ( ? ), while
negatively on the wage elasticity of labour demand (? ). The negotiated wage is
affected by the share of outsourced production ( )/ LM  both directly and indirectly
though its impact on the wage elasticity of labour demand in a way, which depends
on the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labour
input.
By differentiating the negotiated wage (9) with respect to M we find under the
assumption 10 ??? that
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The relationship (10) characterizes how the share of outsourced production can
serve as a strategic commitment device, with the effect of inducing wage moderation.
The technological features summarized by the elasticity of substitution between the
two types of labour inputs play an important role for this wage-moderating effect of
outsourcing. The intuition for this wage-moderating effect can be understood as
follows: A higher outsourcing-in-house production ratio decreases the negotiated
wage rate via two channels: (1) it becomes harder for the union to extract rent in
negotiations because of the induced higher wage elasticity of labour demand, and (2)
a higher outsourcing-in-house production ratio increases the negative effect of the
wage rate on the profit, i.e. 0??
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
? w
M
 when 1??  and thus moderates wage
formation.
We now summarize our analysis of the wage determination in
9Proposition 2 The negotiated wage rate depends negatively on the wage elasticity
of labour demand and a higher share of outsourced production will decrease the
negotiated wage rate when 1?? .
From the negotiated wage (9) we can infer a number of properties for special
cases. If all the bargaining power lies with the union ( 1?? ), the Nash bargaining
solution is simplified to the monopoly union solution
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according to which the wage mark-up depends negatively on the wage elasticity of
labour demand, which is a function of the share of outsourced production. In the
opposite case with all the bargaining power concentrated to the firm ( 0?? ), the
relationship between the negotiated wage and the production mode ratio disappears.
In this case the negotiated wage converges to the competitive wage with bwC ? , i.e.
the wage mark-up is eroded. Intuitively this seems to make sense for the following
reason. The share of outsourced production serves as a strategic commitment device,
which will affect the distribution of the rents, achieved through bargaining, in
imperfectly competitive labour markets. Once the labour market imperfections are
eroded the production mode can no longer play such a strategic role.
V. The Effects of Outsourcing on Equilibrium Unemployment
We now move on to explore the determinants of equilibrium unemployment in a
general equilibrium framework. We are in this section interested in the relationships
between the exogenous production mode (outsourcing) and equilibrium
unemployment.
According to (9) the negotiated wage rate in industry i  is of the form bAwN ? ,
where the mark-up factor is
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In the presence of the positive relative bargaining power of the labour union the
mark-up 1?? A
b
wN  because the wage elasticity of labour demand .1?? This mark-
up factor is, in principle, industry-specific. In a general equilibrium the term b  should
be re-interpreted as the endogenous outside option, which we specify in a
conventional way as
uBwub N ??? )1( ,                                                                                   (12)
where u  is the unemployment rate, B  captures the unemployment benefit and Nw
denotes the negotiated wage rate in all identical industries in the economy (see
Nickell and Layard (1999) p. 3048-3049 for a further discussion). Assuming a
constant benefit replacement ratio NwBq ?  and substituting (12) for b  into the
Nash bargaining solution (9) yields the equilibrium unemployment
??
?
??
? ?
?
?
Aq
u N 11
1
1 ,                                                                                     (13)
where the wage mark-up A is given by (11).
According to (13) a higher benefit-replacement ratio, q , and a higher mark-up
in the wage determination, A , will increase equilibrium unemployment. Further,
from the mark-ups in the wage determination we can conclude that higher wage
elasticity of labour demand will decrease equilibrium unemployment.
As for the impact of the production mode (the outsourcing) on equilibrium
unemployment we initially observe under 10 ??? that
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This offers a characterization of the production mode as a strategic commitment
device with employment effects. Because it holds true that bA
M
w
M
N
?
?
?
, we can
explore the effect of the share of outsourced production on equilibrium
unemployment by combining (13) and (14).  According to Proposition 2 the
relationship between the outsourcing commitment and wage formation and thereby
the relationship between the production mode and equilibrium unemployment
depends on the size of the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labour
inputs.
Our new findings concerning the determinants of equilibrium unemployment with
exogenous production modes can now be summarized in
Proposition 3 A production mode with a higher share of outsourced production
will reduce equilibrium unemployment when 1?? .
Proposition 3 predicts that there is a systematic relationship between the
production mode and equilibrium unemployment such that a higher share of
outsourced production promotes employment in the high-wage country, because the
outsourcing induces downward pressure on the negotiated wage.
VI.  Optimal Outsourcing: The Long-Run Perspective
So far we have restricted ourselves to a short run or medium run perspective,
where the firm has committed itself to the magnitude of its outsourcing activities. We
now turn to explore the initial stage of the decision making structure. At this stage the
firm determines the investments into the establishment of outsourced production
capacity. We are particularly interested in characterizing how the labour market
imperfections impact on the equilibrium production mode, which, as we have
analysed in the previous section, will have effects on the equilibrium unemployment.
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In the long run the firm determines the magnitude of the outsourcing activities
so as to maximize profits. The firm has rational expectations regarding the subsequent
outcomes with respect to wage negotiation and employment and thus, the long-run
production mode decision internalizes the effects of the share of outsourced
production on wages and employment.
The long-run production mode is determined by the optimization problem
)(),(max ** MgMcLwLMR NM ?????             (15) (26)
                                        s.t. 0??w and 0?L? .
The constraints capture that the production mode is set in anticipation of the
subsequent determination of wages and employment. By applying the envelope
theorem we find that the necessary first-order condition associated with the
optimization problem (15) is given by
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Next we briefly analyze the effects of labour market imperfections on optimal
outsourcing. From (16) we can directly see that the presence of the imperfect labour
market adds to the returns because outsourcing has wage-moderating effects, i.e.
0?
?
?
M
wN , as was shown in Proposition 2 .
Condition (16) presents an implicit characterization of the optimal production mode.
We can characterize how labour market imperfections impact on optimal outsourcing
by reporting the following comparative statics result.
Proposition 5 Increased labour market imperfections promote outsourcing when
1?? .
Proof: See Appendix B
Proposition 5 captures the idea that the wage-moderating effect of outsourcing is
stronger, the higher is the bargaining power of the labour union.
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VII.  Conclusions
We have studied the consequences of outsourcing for unemployment as well as
the incentives associated with the introduction of outsourcing. We have shown that
the wage elasticity of labour demand is increasing as a function of the share of
outsourcing, which is a result consistent with existing empirical research (see Senses
(2006)). Furthermore, we have demonstrated that a production mode with a higher
proportion of outsourcing reduces the negotiated wage in the high-wage country with
an imperfectly competitive labour market so that outsourcing reduces equilibrium
unemployment. Finally, and importantly, we have characterized the optimal
committed production mode by demonstrating that stronger labour market
imperfections, measured by the relative bargaining power of labour unions, lead to a
production mode with a higher share of outsourcing.
Our framework has abstracted from the wage dispersion and its potential
relationship with various aspects of outsourcing activities. There exists evidence that
high degrees of unionization and coverage of collective agreements compress the
wage structure. Also higher degrees of centralization of collective bargaining reduce
wage dispersion (see e.g. Rowthorn (1992), EEAG (2004) and Wallerstein (1999)). It
is an important new research topic to analyze the relationships between outsourcing
and the wage dispersion between high-skill and low-skill domestic workers.
14
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Appendix A: Derivation of the wage elasticity of labour demand
By using the production function we can write the wage elasticity of labour demand
as follows
LL
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L
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where the production function (1) with the diminishing returns to scale implies that
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derivatives we have after some rearrangements
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Using (A.1) and (A.2) the wage elasticity of substitution can after some
rearrangements be written in the following way
? ? ? ?1)1(1)1(1
)( 11
11
1)1(1
1
1)1(1
???
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
???
? ??
??
??
?
?
??
?
?
?
??
???
?
?
?
?
?
??
?
?
??
?
aLX
X
aLXXLa
XLa
L
M
This in turn can be simplified to
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Appendix B:  Optimal outsourcing and labour market imperfections
According to (16) the optimal production mode is characterized by
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What is the effect of the union bargaining power on optimal outsourcing?  The
bargaining power affects the optimal outsourcing through
M
wN
?
? , which is negative
from Proposition 2. Differentiating the equation (10) with respect to ?  gives
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 where 0)(
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aY   and M?   has been expressed in  (5).
After some rearrangements (B2) can be written as
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as follows
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Hence 0??
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.  Because we know that *L
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??   is positive it follows that
higher bargaining power of the trade union will add to the returns from outsourcing.
As the costs of establishing capacity for outsourced production are increasing and
convex, we can conclude that the increased labour market imperfections mean that
the first-order condition (16) will be satisfied for higher M. QED.
